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Abstract
Existing Java veriﬁers perform an iterative data-ﬂow analysis to discover the unambiguous type of
values stored on the stack or in registers. Our novel veriﬁcation algorithm uses abstract interpreta-
tion to obtain deﬁnition/use information for each register and stack location in the program, which
in turn is used to transform the program into Static Single Assignment form. In SSA, veriﬁcation
is reduced to simple type compatibility checking between the deﬁnition type of each SSA variable
and the type of each of its uses. Inter-adjacent transitions of a value through stack and registers are
no longer veriﬁed explicitly. This integrated approach is more eﬃcient than traditional bytecode
veriﬁcation but still as safe as strict veriﬁcation, as overall program correctness can be induced
once the data ﬂow from each deﬁnition to all associated uses is known to be type-safe.
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1 Introduction
Mobile programs can be malicious. A host that receives such mobile programs
from an untrusted party or via an untrusted network connection will want a
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guarantee that the mobile code is not about to cause any damage. To this end,
the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) pioneered the concept of code veriﬁcation,
by which a receiving host examines each arriving mobile program to rule out
potentially malicious behavior even before starting execution. This analysis
is necessary since the locations of temporary variables in the JVM are not
statically typed. If veriﬁcation is successful, then the original bytecode is
forwarded to the JVM’s execution component, which may be an interpreter
or a just-in-time compiler. Speciﬁcally, beyond the result denoting whether or
not veriﬁcation was successful, all other information computed by the veriﬁer
is discarded and is not passed onwards. In many cases, this results in a
duplication of work when a just-in-time compiler subsequently performs a
very similar data-ﬂow analysis all over again.
In this paper, we give a brief overview of an alternative veriﬁcation mech-
anism that avoids such duplication of work. Instead of verifying Java Virtual
Machine Language (JVML) bytecode directly, we annotate it in such a way
that the ﬂow of values between instructions becomes explicit rather than going
through the operand stack and then transform the annotated bytecode into
Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [3].
Verifying programs in SSA signiﬁcantly reduces the number of points in
the program that have to be type-checked, because only producers and con-
sumers of values are veriﬁed. Inter-adjacent transitions of a value through
stack and registers are no longer veriﬁed explicitly. This integrated approach
is more eﬃcient than traditional bytecode veriﬁcation but still as safe as strict
veriﬁcation, as overall program correctness can be induced once the data ﬂow
from each deﬁnition to all associated uses is known to be type-safe.
Our benchmarks indicate that the aggregate time required for transform-
ing JVML into SSA and verifying the program in this representation is still
less than the time needed for performing the standard veriﬁcation algorithm
directly on JVML. Our approach imposes no overhead for methods that will
be interpreted without JIT compilation, because SSA-based veriﬁcation is still
overall faster than the traditional veriﬁer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a
brief overview of the traditional Java bytecode veriﬁer and introduces SSA-
based veriﬁcation. Section 3 compares the performance of our method to that
of Sun’s standard veriﬁer. Section 4 discusses related work and Section 5
contains our conclusion and points to future work.
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instruction ::= core | dataﬂow
core ::= iconst n | lconst l | iadd | ladd | ifeq L | return
dataﬂow ::= pop | dup | dup 2 | istore x | iload x | lstore x | lload x
Fig. 1. Instructions in JVMLS . The arguments n, l, x, and L must fulﬁll the conditions −1 ≤ n ≤ 5,
l ∈ {0, 1}, x, L ∈ N.
2 Veriﬁcation in Static Single Assignment Form
This section introduces a subset of JVML, brieﬂy describes traditional Java
bytecode veriﬁcation, and discusses the abstraction used in our approach as
well as our novel veriﬁcation method.
2.1 JVMLS
Figure 1 shows the grammar for JVMLS , a subset of JVML which we use
here for illustration purposes. We split the instruction set in core instructions
and data-ﬂow instructions. Core instructions operate on values stored on the
operand stack, while data-ﬂow instructions only facilitate the ﬂow of values
between core instructions by manipulating the state of the operand stack and
exchanging values between operand stack and variables.
Values are produced by core instructions and can be consumed by other
core instructions. During the lifetime of a value it can reside on the operand
stack or in variables and in multiple locations at the same time. Data-ﬂow
instructions neither produce nor consume values, they merely transport values
between stack locations and variables. 2
2.2 Java Bytecode Veriﬁcation
JVML instructions can read and store intermediate values in two locations:
the operand stack and local variables. These locations are ad-hoc polymorphic
in that the same stack location or local variable can hold values of diﬀerent
types during program execution. Veriﬁcation ensures that these locations are
used consistently and intermediate values are always read back with the same
types that they were originally written as.
Veriﬁcation also ensures control-ﬂow safety, but this is a comparatively
trivial task. Conversely, verifying that the data ﬂow is well-typed is rather
complex. The JVM bytecode veriﬁer [12,25] uses iterative data-ﬂow analysis
and an abstract interpreter for JVML instructions. Unlike JVM, the stack
cells and local variables of the abstract interpreter store types, rather than
2 Even though it consumes a value, the pop instruction is a data-ﬂow instruction, since it
merely manipulates the stack such that the topmost value can no longer be used.
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values. From the perspective of the veriﬁer, JVM instructions are operations
that execute on types.
JVML veriﬁcation works at the method level. With a co-inductive ar-
gument it follows that if every method is veriﬁable, the whole program is
veriﬁable, too. In the rest of this paper, we use program and method inter-
changeably.
The central responsibility of the Java bytecode veriﬁer is to check that
stack locations and local variables are used in a type-safe manner. This is the
case if the deﬁnitions and uses of values have compatible types. To ensure
this, the veriﬁer algorithm has to determine the types of all stack locations
and variables for each instruction.
2.3 Abstractions
In JVML, there is no obvious link between the deﬁnition of a value and its
uses. However, even if deﬁnition-use chains were available for each value in
a JVML program, it would still be impossible to verify a Java program in
a single pass by comparing the type of each deﬁnition with its uses. The
reason for this becomes more obvious if we consider how we categorized the
instructions of JVMLS . Only core instructions deﬁne and use values. Data-
ﬂow instructions merely facilitate the ﬂow of values between core instructions.
For Core instructions the expected types of any consumed operands and the
types of any produced values are always known statically. In contrast, data-
ﬂow instructions are polymorphic. In general, it is not possible to determine
the type of the value produced by a data-ﬂow instruction without knowing
the type of its operands. The result type of a dup instruction, for example,
depends on the type of the value on top of the stack.
While local variable access instructions such as iload x suggest stronger
static typing, this works for scalar types only. In the JVM, object references
are written and read from local variables using astore x and aload x, and
data-ﬂow analysis is still necessary to determine the precise type of the vari-
ables accessed.
The rationale of our approach is to replace the stack and local variables
by a register ﬁle, and to redeﬁne the dynamic semantics of instructions to
actually work on these registers. This replacement allows us to transform the
stack based code into SSA and to perform type checking only between the
deﬁnitions of values and their actual uses. We abstract each instruction in a
program to a tuple consisting of the depth of the stack before that instruction
is executed, a mapping from stack cells and local variables to the instructions
that deﬁne them, the set of stack cells and local variables the instruction reads
and writes, as well as a map from stack cells to the values that reside in them.
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The main contribution of these components is to allow the dynamic semantics
to work on a register ﬁle and to enable the transformation of the code into
SSA before veriﬁcation.
2.4 Algorithm
The goal of our approach is to avoid an up-front iterative data-ﬂow analysis to
verify JVML. Instead, the JVML code is annotated so that the ﬂow of values
between core instructions becomes explicit instead of relying on an operand
stack. This enables us to eliminate all data-ﬂow instructions from the code
after SSA construction. These instructions are no longer needed because they
only facilitate data ﬂow, but do not actually compute anything. Once the code
consists of core instructions only and is in SSA form, it is possible to perform
type-safety checks by directly relating the type of each deﬁnition with the
corresponding uses (deﬁnition-use veriﬁcation).
For a small example program, the result of the annotation step is shown in
Figure 2. Each instruction is annotated with the current stack depth before the
instruction is executed. Using these annotations and the dynamic semantics
of JVMLS , instructions no longer depend on the stack to connect operands
to their deﬁnitions. Values on the stack are labeled relative to their distance
to the bottom of the stack. The value produced by an iconst instruction
executed on a previously empty stack, for example, would be labeled with 0,
because it is currently at the bottom of the stack. This labeling permits to
resolve stack references without actually maintaining a stack data structure.
An iconst instruction annotated with sd = 0, for example, always writes
its result to stack cell 0. In unannotated JVML the stack cells receiving the
produced value would depend on the state of the dynamic stack at that point
in the program.
Following the JVML machine model we split long integers into two halves.
Thus, instructions operating on long integers push and pop pairs of values
PC Instruction StackDepth Stack Vars
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1
1 lconst 0 0 L L’
2 lconst 1 2 L L’ L L’
3 iconst 1 4 L L’ L L’ I
4 ifeq L 5 L L’ L L’
5 dup 2 4 L L’ L L’ L L’
6 ladd 6 L L’ L L’
7 L: ladd 4 L L’
8 lstore 0 2 L L’
Fig. 2. An example program, and the abstraction for stack and variable states. Each instruction
is labeled with the stack depth prior to the execution of that particular instruction. L stands for
LONG, L’ for LONG’, and I for INT.
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onto and from the operand stack. Correspondingly, for each deﬁnition of a
long integer two values are deﬁned, one for the bottom half (type LONG), and
one for the top half (type LONG’).
After the annotation phase, our veriﬁcation algorithm ﬁrst computes the
Iterative Dominance Frontier (IDF) [20] for all deﬁnitions of values, that is val-
ues written into stack cells or local variables. Each reachable instruction in the
program is visited in dominator-tree order and all references of core instruc-
tions to stack cells and local variables are resolved to SSA-names. Data-ﬂow
instructions do neither produce nor consume any values and are eliminated
through copy propagation.
After transformation into SSA and copy-propagation, we can perform the
actual type-checking. Similar to type inference performed by the traditional
veriﬁer, the type of φ-nodes is the common supertype of each deﬁnition the
φ-node refers to (φ operands), while regular core instructions always deﬁne a
value with a distinct type. These can be matched to their respective uses in
a single sweep over the program in linear time.
Type-checking is performed lazily in the sense that only the minimal num-
ber of instructions is checked to ensure overall type-safety while for dataﬂow
instructions only the proper data ﬂow is guaranteed. Considering only the
dynamic semantics, the data ﬂow veriﬁed is obviously equivalent to the data
ﬂow that would have resulted by interpreting the original JVML program.
However, since data-ﬂow instructions have been eliminated, some of the re-
strictions enforced by their static semantics do no longer apply. The following
JVML program, for example, will be rejected by the Java veriﬁer, but is valid
in our SSA-based dialect:
1: lconst 0
2: istore 1
3: iload 1
4: lstore 2
In this example, in Line 1 a long integer is pushed onto the stack as a pair of
halves (LONG, LONG′). Partially storing the long integer in an integer register
(Line 2) is rejected by the traditional veriﬁer. In contrast, since our veriﬁer
does not consider the typing rules of data-ﬂow instructions, it accepts this
code fragment, because the (LONG, LONG′) pair pushed in Line 1 is restored on
the stack before it is used in Line 4. It is important to note that this program,
while rejected by the JVM, is perfectly safe when executed.
Due to space limitations, we are unable to elaborate on how to verify
exceptions, arrays, and object initialization and refer to our technical report [7]
instead.
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3 Benchmarks
To evaluate the performance of our SSA-based veriﬁer, we have implemented
a prototype veriﬁer based on the algorithm presented in this paper. Our
prototype inlines subroutines before veriﬁcation. In order to arrive at a fair
comparison with Java’s standard veriﬁer, we use the same modiﬁed Java code
with inlined subroutines also for the JVML veriﬁcation benchmarks. Our ra-
tionale behind this is that the subroutine construct in Java is obsolete and will
probably be removed in future versions of the Java virtual machine. Further-
more, our current algorithm depends on the fact that the control-ﬂow graph
can be recovered quickly from JVML code. In the presence of subroutines,
this is not always the case as returning edges from subroutines are not explicit.
As a comparative benchmark, we compare the total runtime of our SSA-
based veriﬁer to the runtime of Sun’s DFA-based veriﬁer. In both cases,
we use the preverify tool shipped as part of Sun’s KVM [24] to inline all
subroutine calls before measuring the actual veriﬁcation times. Both veriﬁers
are implemented in C and use the same underlying framework to read and
represent Java class ﬁles.
To eliminate any cache eﬀects and to compensate for timing errors, both
veriﬁers are run one hundred times on each method from the test set. There
currently is no established set of benchmarks to test the performance of ver-
iﬁers. Benchmark suites such as SPECjvm [19] are designed to evaluate the
performance of code execution, not code veriﬁcation. Thus, we have decided
to use various parts of the Java Runtime Libraries (JDK 1.4.2) as a test set.
Figure 3 list some characteristics of the used classes. All measurements were
conducted on a Pentium4 2.53GHz CPU with 512MB of RAM, running under
RedHat Linux 9.
Figure 4 compares the total runtime of the traditional DFA-based veriﬁer
with our SSA-based veriﬁer. Veriﬁcation in SSA-form is approximately 15%
faster than the traditional algorithm when comparing the total runtime. Not
considering the time spent to calculate the dominator relation and the domi-
nance frontier, SSA-based veriﬁcation is approximately 45% faster. The total
# of method size stack depth local variables
methods ø max ø max ø max
java/* 6490 41.36 4065 2.74 14 2.47 37
java/io 1213 38.12 1295 2.39 8 2.35 15
java/lang 1336 38.41 4065 2.32 10 2.17 37
java/math 405 72.67 3041 3.16 8 3.73 29
java/nio 2096 26.80 417 3.05 11 2.31 15
java/util 2359 49.21 2916 2.64 14 2.62 25
Fig. 3. Characteristics of the test set we used to compare the runtime of our SSA-based veriﬁer
with the runtime of the traditional veriﬁer.
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number of instructions that has to be type-checked in the case of SSA-based
veriﬁcation is roughly 38% less than for the traditional veriﬁer. The only
noteworthy exception is java/math, which actually requires slightly more in-
structions to be type-checked in SSA form. This is caused by our treatment of
the LONG and DOUBLE types, which we split in two halves while the traditional
veriﬁer can treat them in a single step.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the total runtime and the number of instructions that have to be type-checked
for the traditional DFA-based veriﬁer and our SSA-based veriﬁer.
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4 Related Work
In addition to the informal description of the JVM [12], a number of formal
speciﬁcations of the JVML and its veriﬁer have been proposed [6,11,21]. In
this context, subroutines are of particular interest and several type systems
have been proposed for them [15,16,22]. All these approaches have in common
that they rely on some form of iterative data-ﬂow analysis [11,17] to decide
type-safety.
Proof-carrying code (PCC) [14] addresses this problem by relieving the
code consumer of the burden to verify the code. Instead, the code producer
computes and proves a veriﬁcation condition. The code consumer recomputes
the veriﬁcation condition and checks whether the attached proof is valid. PCC
can even be used to prove safety properties of machine code. SSA-based
veriﬁcation, in contrast, is limited to mobile code formats such as Java, but
has the advantage that it only requires the actual code as input, and no
additional information such as proofs.
The split veriﬁer approach [23], based on the idea of Lightweight Byte-
code Veriﬁcation [18], applies the PCC idea to Java bytecode. A preveriﬁer
annotates the JVML with the ﬁxed-point of the data-ﬂow analysis otherwise
performed by the JVM during class loading. For annotated class ﬁles the
veriﬁcation is reduced to conﬁrming that the annotation is indeed a valid
ﬁxed-point. Just as in the case of Necula’s PCC, the annotations enlarge the
overall size of class ﬁles, while our approach does not rely on any additional
annotation.
Similar to the split veriﬁer, the veriﬁer for Java smart cards [10] reduces the
burden on the veriﬁer through oﬄine bytecode transformation. A preprocessor
tool ensures that the Java stack is empty after every branch instruction and
that all registers are mono-typed. In contrast to our approach, the Java smart
card veriﬁer fails for Java class ﬁles which have not been processed this way.
Inherently safe mobile code representation formats such as SafeTSA [1]
eliminate the need for veriﬁcation as mobile code is stored in a self-consistent
format that cannot represent anything but well-formed and well-typed pro-
grams. Just like PCC, such formats have a systematic advantage over SSA-
based veriﬁcation, but require abandoning the existing Java class ﬁle format,
which is not always acceptable. Our approach and SafeTSA have in common
that they both make the code available to the JIT in SSA-form, which can be
used to speed up code generation.
SSA-based representations have been used in several approaches to compi-
lation of bytecode. Marmot [4] is a research platform for studying the imple-
mentation of high-level programming languages. The main diﬀerence to our
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work is that Marmot only accepts veriﬁable programs. This property of the
input program allows to make certain assumptions on properties of the code,
e.g. about the types of local variables and stack entries. Similar to our work,
Marmot inlines subroutines to avoid complex encoding as normal control ﬂow
similar to Freund [5].
As Kelsey and Appel have observed [2,8], there is a close relation be-
tween SSA form and functional programming. Therefore, the work of League
et al. [9] is directly related to our work. λJVM, a functional representation of
Java bytecode, makes data ﬂow explicit, just like our work. They also split
veriﬁcation up in two phases, one during the construction of λJVM code, and
a simple type checking later. However, they initially perform a regular data-
ﬂow analysis to infer types for the stack and local variables at each program
point. This is in contrast to our approach, were the reason for splitting the
veriﬁcation in two phases is exactly to avoid the initial data-ﬂow analysis.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Existing JVML veriﬁers perform substantial data-ﬂow analysis but do not
preserve the results of this analysis for subsequent code generation and op-
timization phases. We have presented an alternative veriﬁer that not only
is faster than the standard Java veriﬁer, but that additionally computes the
Dominator Tree and brings the program into Static Single Assignment form.
As a result, the respective computations need not be repeated in subsequent
stages of the dynamic compilation pipeline. Since our algorithm has an overall
lower cost than traditional Java bytecode veriﬁcation, this essentially makes
an SSA representation available “for free” to the virtual machine, reducing
the cost for JIT compilation.
In the larger context of veriﬁable mobile code, our results indicate that
veriﬁcation should not be practiced in isolation “up front”, but integrated
with the rest of the client-side mobile code pipeline. Hence, we expect our
approach to be applicable to other mobile-code systems besides the JVM,
such as Microsoft’s .NET platform [13].
Our work is also relevant for all existing JVM implementations which al-
ready use SSA internally for code optimization. If a VM already has means
to translate code into SSA, having an “up front” data ﬂow based veriﬁer is
simply redundant. We have shown that it is possible to delay type checking
and to ﬁrst transform the program into SSA. In fact, our algorithm is the
ﬁrst documented approach to safely translate Java code into SSA without any
prior data-ﬂow analysis and veriﬁcation.
In the future, we plan to examine how subroutines could be supported
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in our framework. While subroutines are rapidly disappearing from JVML,
they are still interesting from an academic perspective. They reinforce the
question whether and how an SSA-based representation can be obtained for
polymorphic code in which not all control-ﬂow edges are explicit.
We are also interested in exploring structural SSA-annotation of JVML
code. For this, JVML code is rearranged in such a way that a speciﬁc
structure-aware SSA-based veriﬁer can infer the ﬁnal SSA-form of the code
without actually calculating the Dominator Tree and Iterative Dominance
Frontiers. As the code is still expressed in pure JVML, it is fully backward
compatible with existing VMs and does not require any additional annota-
tions. While the rearranged code is likely to be less compact than its original
form, this scheme will further reduce the required veriﬁcation eﬀort.
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